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POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION V.
LITIGATION IN BRAZIL: COSTS AND
DURATION OF THE PROCEDURES
Gustavo Sampaio Valverde*
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS paper intends to provide useful information in order to assist
those negotiating contracts in Brazil to decide whether to submit
potential future disputes to arbitration or litigation. The elements
affecting this decision normally relate to factors such as the enforceability
of the decision, partiality and risk of corruption, expertise of judges/arbi-
trators, and familiarity of the parties with the procedure. This paper fo-
cuses on two other very relevant factors, namely the costs and the
duration of the procedures.
The importance of cost and duration and their influence in the con-
tracting parties' choice between arbitration and litigation are somewhat
self-evident. These two factors are also related to each other insofar as
the longer the procedure, the more expensive it becomes. The costs in-
curred by the party will eventually reduce the value of the right being
adjudicated to it. Even if the party later recovers part of these costs by
virtue of the common rule in Brazil that places the economic burden of
the procedures on the shoulders of the defeated party, this recovery is
never in full.1 The duration of the procedure also directly affects the
value of the right, especially in those situations where the party would be
able to obtain other investments at a rate of return higher than the legal
or contractual interest rate accrued on the disputed right.
For many years observers have made record of most Latin American
countries' reluctance to embrace arbitration as an effective means of dis-
pute resolution. Even though the progress experienced by the region
lately may not yet have changed the long-held foreign investors' suspi-
cion, it is indisputable that improvements have been made. In recent
years with the opening of their countries' economies, Latin America has
*Legal Counsel of Construtora Norberto Odebrecht S.A; LLM Columbia Law
School; Master in Public Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo; Post
Graduation in Tax Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo; Bachelor in
Law, Federal University of Bahia.
1. See CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 20 (Brazil), available at http://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil/Leis/L5869.htm [hereinafter C.P.C.].
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sought to adopt dispute resolution mechanisms that might favor foreign
investments. This effort has created a legal environment more favorable
to arbitration, as foreign investors are usually reluctant in submitting the
resolution of their disputes to national courts, and the local judiciary is
seldom able to handle the ever-increasing complexity of business dis-
putes. In following this tendency, Latin American countries started to
both adhere to multilateral conventions on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign arbitral awards and to review their domestic arbitration
statutes. This renewed approach resulted in an increasing number of
Latin American parties participating in international arbitration in the
last decade, as well as in an increasing number of Latin American experts
being appointed as arbitrators in the major arbitral tribunals around the
world.
Brazil has followed the continental tendency toward arbitration and
has indeed created a friendlier environment to arbitration within its bor-
ders. In the past ten years the country ratified the Inter-American Con-
vention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention),
the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Effects of Foreign
Judgment and Arbitral Awards (Montevideo Convention), and the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (New York Convention). 2 The country also enacted a new
arbitration statute in 1996 (Arbitration Statute), which had its constitu-
tional conformity affirmed by the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) later in
2001.3 Accompanying these improvements, and under this renewed legal
framework, the number of arbitral procedures in Brazil has increased
significantly.
This paper will use the Chamber of Arbitration and Mediation of the
Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada (CCBC) and the Chamber of Ar-
bitration and Mediation of Sao Paulo (FIESP) as illustrative examples of
arbitration in Brazil, due both to their importance and to their location in
Brazil's major business center of Sao Paulo. The CCBC is the oldest and
the most traditional chamber in the country. 4 The FIESP was established
more recently but has been increasingly regarded as the major arbitration
center in Brazil.5
2. See Panama Convention, Jan. 30,1975, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/
comarb/intlconv/caicpae.asp; Montevideo Convention, May 8, 1979, available at
http://www.camarb.com.br/areas/subareas-conteudo.aspx?subareano=148; New
York Convention, July 6, 1988, available at http://www.camaradearbitragemsp.org.
br/legislacao/convencaointer.htm#nova.
3. See S.T.F.-SE-AgR 5206/EP-Espanha, Relator: Min. Sepulveda Pertence, 12.12.
2001, 2149 S.T.F.J. 30.4.2004, 958 (Brazil), available at http://www.stf.gov.br/juris
prudencia/nova/doc.asp?sl=000298589&p=l&d=SJUR&f=s&na=SE-AgR % 20520
6%20EP%20-%20ESPANHA.
4. See C~mara de Com6rcio Brasil-Canadi, http://www.ccbc.org.br (last visited Nov.
5, 2006).
5. See C~mara de Mediaqao e Arbitragem de Sdo Paulo, http://www.camaradearbi-
tragemsp.org.br/.
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In spite of the noted development, a significant part of the interna-
tional commercial arbitration procedures involving Latin American par-
ties still take place in foreign venues. Even Latin American parties
executing international transactions within the region are often puzzled
by the multiplicity of conflicting arbitral rules. Furthermore, the absence
of information as to local practices and the lack of tradition of the local
arbitral tribunals are also factors contributing to the parties' general pref-
erence in conducting arbitration elsewhere.
This situation affects Brazil in particular because the country has tradi-
tionally been considered the black sheep of Latin American arbitration. 6
Brazil ratified the Panama Convention only in 1995, the Montevideo
Convention in 1997 and the New York Convention was not ratified until
2002. The Arbitration Statute does not follow the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration and embodies some unusual provisions that have
raised some inconvenient issues not yet settled by domestic courts. 7
These facts account for the country's lack of tradition and expertise and
have a negative impact on the foreign investors' decision either to subject
disputes to Brazilian arbitral bodies or choose Brazil as the venue for
their arbitrations. 8
In view of that, this paper will also consider an international body as a
likely arbitration alternative for Latin American transactions. The inter-
national institution that is most often appointed to administer disputes
arising out of international business transactions in Brazil is the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The ICC has increased its experi-
ence in the region and is fully equipped to conduct arbitrations in
Portuguese, having several Brazilian experts integrating its body of arbi-
trators. 9
Ad hoc arbitration is ruled out of the present analysis because institu-
tional arbitration is normally considered as a more suitable choice for
resolving international commercial disputes. 10 Considering the focus of
6. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA ch. 1. (Nigel Blackaby et al.
eds., Kluwer Law Int'l 2001).
7. One of these issues concerns the role that the compromisso perform in those con-
tracts that either provides for the means for the constitution of the tribunal or
appoints any existing institutional rule. Law No. 9.307, of Sept. 23, 1996, D.O.,
arts. 6, 7: 18897, Sept. 1996 (Brazil), available at http://www.camaradearbitrage
msp.org.br/ingles/legislacao/frcmeio.htm [hereinafter Law No. 9.307].
8. See Carlos Nehring Netto, The New Brazilian Arbitration Law, in INT'L COM.
ARB. IN LATIN AMERICA, THE ICC INT'L CT. OF ARB. BULL., SPEC. SuPP. 11
(Paris, ICC Publishing 1997).
9. See ICC, http://www.iccwbo.org/drs/english/expertise/alltopics.asp [hereinafter
ICC].
10. The Brazilian Arbitration Statute provides in its article 5 that
[i]f the parties, in the arbitration clause, select the rules of any arbitral
institution or specialized entity, the arbitral proceedings shall be com-
menced and conducted pursuant to such rules; it being also possible that
the parties determine in the arbitration clause itself, or in a separate doc-
ument, the agreed procedure instituting the arbitral proceedings.
Law No. 9.307, supra note 7.
518 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 12
the paper, it might be argued that ad hoc arbitration tends to be less ex-
pensive because the parties do not bear the administrative expenses of
the institutions and often can limit the value of arbitrators' fees. Addi-
tionally, ad hoc proceedings are more flexible, and therefore permit a
more efficient management of time.
Nevertheless, institutional arbitration is backed by a permanent body,
which contributes to a more reliable and effective mechanism to produce
consistent and legally binding decisions. 11 The awards rendered by insti-
tutions have the imprimatur of an established and internationally ac-
knowledged body, which may enhance recognition and enforcement of
the award. Moreover, the arbitration rules of institutions are well-estab-
lished and often provide for simple and predictable procedures. These
rules discourage delays and dilatory tactics by the parties and may func-
tion as an important tool to speed up the arbitration, as incidental and
unforeseen matters arising during the proceedings can be handled
efficiently.
In the Brazilian legal environment, the institutional arbitration might
have a further advantage in clarifying the dispensability of performing the
"submission to arbitration" provided for in article 6 of the Arbitration
Statute.12 This article, coupled with article 7, states that "[i]f the parties
fail to agree ahead of time on the form for instituting the arbitral pro-
ceedings" and there is "resistance as to the commencement of the arbitral
proceedings" by either of the parties, the interested party must seek re-
dress in Brazilian courts to enforce the arbitration agreement. 13 This re-
quirement may represent a significant waste of money and time. Parties
opting for an institutional arbitration, whose rules will determine from
the outset the form of instituting the arbitral proceedings, are likely to
avoid such a situation.
In short, this paper assumes that in an international transaction the
parties will assess the potential advantages and disadvantages of arbitra-
tion in light of either the Brazilian CCBC and FIESP, or the international
Icc.
11. See Carlos J. Bianchi, Practical Aspects of Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
in Latin America, 17-11 MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 17 (2002).
12. Article 6 of the Brazilian Statute no. 9.307/96 provides that
[i]f the parties fail to agree ahead of time on the form for instituting the
arbitral proceedings, the interested party shall notify the other party, ei-
ther by mail or through any other means of communication with confir-
mation or receipt, of its intention to commence arbitral proceedings,
fixing a date, time and place for the signature of the submission to
arbitration[;]
and article 7 of the same statute provides that
[i]n case there is an arbitration clause but resistance as to the commence-
ment of the arbitral proceedings, the interested party may request the
Court to summon the other party to appear in Court so that the submis-
sion to arbitration may be signed; the judge shall order a special hearing
for this purpose.
Law No. 9.307, supra note 7.
13. Id.
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Further. the present analysis assumes that the transaction takes place in
Sao Paulo, and thus in the absence of an arbitration clause, state courts
would be competent to resolve any dispute under the relevant agreement.
This assumption relies on the fact that Sao Paulo is the most economically
developed state in the country and where the most important business
transactions occur. On the other hand, Federal Courts in Brazil only as-
sert jurisdiction over disputes that entail a federal entity interest, which is
not usually the case in business transactions involving two private
parties. 14
A commercial dispute arising out of a contract where Sao Paulo has
been chosen as the venue for litigation will initially be subject to a trial
judge of a Sao Paulo district court.15 This judge is competent for holding
commercial procedures between private parties, which does not involve
any federal interest. The district court's decision might be challenged by
either of the parties, through appeals addressed to the state court of ap-
peal.' 6 The court of appeal has broad competence to review the district
judge's decision, both on law and fact.17 If the court of appeal's decision
addresses any issue of law contained in a federal statute, its decision may
be subject to review by the Superior Tribunal de Justica (STJ) on the
grounds of a special appeal. 18 Similarly, if either the state court or the
STJ's decision addresses any constitutional issues, it may be challenged
by an extraordinary appeal to the STF.19 Due to the large amount of
federal statutes existing in Brazil and the comprehensive nature of its
Constitution, both the special and extraordinary appeals are largely used
in most lawsuits held in the country.
Therefore, in order to properly assess the costs and duration of such a
judicial procedure, it is necessary to take into account these four levels of
decision making: the district court, the court of appeals, the STJ, and the
STF.
In summary, this paper compares the costs and length of the arbitral
proceedings in the CCBC, FIESP, and ICC, with the costs and length of
judicial proceedings held in Brazil's Sao Paulo state courts, including the
special and extraordinary appeals to the higher federal courts on the
grounds of any federal or constitutional violation.
Section 2 of this paper addresses the issue of cost, and is subdivided
into sub-sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. Sub-section 2.1 is further broken
down into items A, B, and C, each of them dealing with the costs of arbi-
tration in each of the CCBC, FIESP, and ICC. Sub-section 2.2 addresses
the costs of litigation in the state of Sao Paulo as well as in the Brazilian
14. See CONSTITUICAO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 109 (Brazil), available at https://www.
planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constitui % C3 % A7ao.htm [hereinafter
C.F.]
15. See id. at art. 125; C.P.C., supra note 1, at arts. 94, 95, & 100.
16. See C.P.C., supra note 1, at art. 513.
17. See id. at art. 515.
18. See C.F., supra note 14, at art. 105(111).
19. See id. at art. 102(111).
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higher courts that are likely to handle a commercial dispute in the coun-
try. Sub-section 2.3 establishes a comparison between the costs of arbi-
tration and litigation, and is also further subdivided into items A, B, and
C to compare the costs involved in claims of different sizes: $1 million,
$30 million, and $100 million. Sub-section 2.4 provides analysis and com-
ments on the data collected.
Section 3 of this paper deals with the issue of duration of the proceed-
ings, and is subdivided into Sub-sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. Sub-section 3.1
covers the duration of arbitration procedures in each of the CCBC,
FIESP, and ICC. Sub-section 3.2 deals with the duration of litigation pro-
cedures in the state of Sao Paulo and Brazilian higher courts. Sub-section
3.3 provides analysis and comments on the findings.
Section 4 makes a comparison between arbitration and litigation on the
basis of both cost and timing, and is also subdivided into sub-sections 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3. Sub-section 4.1 addresses claims of $1 million, sub-section
4.2 addresses claims of $30 million, and sub-section 4.3 addresses claims
of $100 million.
Finally, section 5 of the paper provides general guidelines based on the




The CCBC was created in 1979 as the first body holding arbitration
procedures in Brazil. 20 As of December 2005, it had administered thirty-
eight arbitral procedures in matters related to the construction industry,
execution of contracts, financing, corporate disputes, sales contracts, and
more.21 The CCBC has established a close relationship with the Sao
Paulo Stock Exchange and with its highly regarded companies in terms of
corporate governance, therefore being considered one of the most suita-
ble bodies to hold corporate and financial market disputes in Brazil. 22
The cost of an arbitration procedure at the CCBC comprises: arbitra-
tors' fees, court fees, experts fees, and other expenses.23
a. Arbitrators' Fees
The arbitrators' fees are priced at $162 per hour for each arbitrator
working on a CCBC procedure. 24 This fee is paid directly to the arbitra-
tors. The minimum pre-determined amount of time in each arbitration




23. C~mara de Com6rcio Brasil-Canadi Table of Arbitration Fees and Costs, http://
www.ccbc.org.br/arbitrageml.asp?subcategoria=tabela %20de %20custos#.
24. The exchange rate Real/Dollar has fluctuated a little lately. For instance, the ratio
on 11/11/2005 was R$2,16/US$1.00 and on 08/30/2006 was R$2,13/US$1.00. For the
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procedure is 100 hours per arbitrator. 25
b. Court Fees
Apart from the arbitrators' fees, the parties must pay a court fee in the
amount of $925 for each month the arbitration is outstanding.26 The
court fee is payable directly to the chamber with the caveat that those
companies associated with the CCBC will receive a 15 percent discount
on this fee. 27
c. Expert Fees
If the arbitration requires any technical work by an expert, the parties
will have to pay the expert fee, at a value fixed according to the nature of
each procedure.28
d. Other Expenses
All expenses incurred by the arbitrators or the experts, such as travel
expenses, hotel, food, and so forth, will be charged to the party who has
required the act giving rise to the expense, or to both parties if the act has
been required directly by the CCBC.29
2. FIESP
Despite the fact that it was created only nine years ago, the FIESP has
already administered thirty-four arbitrations, ten that are still currently
outstanding.30 Compared to the CCBC, the matters subject to the FIESP
are somewhat broader, but also of considerable value, complexity, and
importance.
At the FIESP chamber the parties will incur the following costs: arbi-
trators' fees, registration fee, administration fee, and other expenses. 31
a. Arbitrators' Fees
The arbitrators' fee at the FIESP will be calculated based on a rate of
$162 per hour for each arbitrator. 32 The minimum amount of hours re-
quired in each arbitration varies with the value of the claim, and shall be
determined in accordance with the following table:33
purposes of the conversions herein the paper uses the former ratio. See Central
Bank of Brazil, http://www.bcb.gov.br/.






30. See Cdmara de Mediaqao e Arbitragem de S~o Paulo, http://www.camaradearbi-
tragemsp.org.br/.
31. See TABLE OF ARBITRATOR COSTS AND FEES OF THE FIESP CHAMBER, available
at http://www.camaradearbitragemsp.org.br/servico/tabela.htm.
32. See id. at art. 3(2).
33. See id. at art. 3(1).
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Minimum of hours per
Value of the Claim arbitrator
Up to $46,296 30
From $46,297 to $231,481 50
From $231,482 to $462,962 80
Above $462,963 100
b. Registration Fee
The registration fee is due upon notification to commence the arbitra-
tion. This fee is calculated according to the value of the claim as
follows: 34
Value of the Case Registration Fee
(in US Dollars) (in US Dollars)
Up to 46,296 231
From 46,297 to 231,481 462
From 231,482 to 462,962 925
Above 462,962 1,388
c. Administration Fee
The party initiating the arbitration will pay the FIESP the amount cor-
responding to 2 percent of the value of the disputed right as an adminis-
tration fee.35 This fee is due upon the signing of the Term of Arbitration
referred to in article 3 of the FIESP Rules.36 If no value has been as-
signed to the case, the chamber will decide what amount shall be col-
lected as the administration fee.37 This fee is capped at $27,777,
regardless of the amount in dispute, and the minimum amount that shall
be collected there under is $2,777.38
d. Other Expenses
In addition to these fees, the parties are also responsible for paying all
expenses necessary for the adequate conduction of the arbitration. 39
Among these expenses are those incurred by the arbitrators in the execu-
tion of their duties, expert examination fees, travel expenses, expenses
34. See id. at art. 1(1).
35. See id. at art. 2(1).
36. See FIESP RULES, art. 3, available at http://www.camaradearbitragemsp.org.br/
ingles/documentos/arbitration rules.pdf
37. See TABLE OF ARBITRATOR COSTS AND FEES OF THE FIESP CHAMBER, supra
note 31, at art. 2.
38. See id. at art. 2(1)(a), (b).
39. See id. at art. 4.
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dealing with examinations and hearings outside the venue of the arbitra-
tion, and expenses related to the holding of hearings in non-business
hours. 40
3. ICC
The ICC is the world's leading chamber in the field of international
commercial arbitration. It was established in 1923 and has pioneered the
holding of modern arbitration procedures in the world. 41 Since its crea-
tion, the ICC has administered over 13,000 international arbitration dis-
putes involving parties from more than 170 countries.42
The costs of arbitration at the ICC include: arbitrators fees', adminis-
trative costs, experts fees, and other expenses.4 3
a. Arbitrators Fees
The arbitrators' fees are managed and fixed by the court on the basis of
the sum in dispute, according to the following scale:44
Sum in dispute (in US Dollars) Fees
Minimum Maximum
Up to 50,000 $2,500 17%
From 50,001 to 100,000 2% 11%
From 100,001 to 500,000 1% 5.5%
From 500,001 to 1,000,000 0.75% 3.50%
From 1,000,001 to 2,000,000 0.5% 2.75%
From 2,000,001 to 5,000,000 0.25% 1.12%
From 5,000,001 to 10,000,000 0.10% 0.616%
From 10,000,001 to 50,000,000 0.05% 0.193%
From 50,000,001 to 80,000,000 0.03% 0.136%
From 80,000,001 to 100,000,000 0.02% 0.112%
Over 100,000,000 0.01% 0.056%
To calculate the arbitrators' fee, the amount corresponding to each suc-
cessive row of the table should be worked out separately so that for each
slice of value, the correspondent percentage shall be applied. These par-
tial amounts will be added together to determine the total amount of the
arbitrators' fee.
40. See id.
41. See ICC, supra note 9.
42. See id.
43. See ICC, RULES OF ARBITRATION (2003), APPENDIX III: ARBITRATION COSTS
AND FEES, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf
documents/rules/rulesarb-english.pdf [hereinafter ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION].
44. See id.
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In determining the arbitrators' fee, the ICC will also take into consider-
ation the diligence of the arbitrators, the time spent, the rapidity of the
proceedings, and the complexity of the dispute.4 5 The fee is multiplied by
the number of arbitrators, up to a maximum that normally will not exceed
three times the fees of one arbitrator.
Under exceptional circumstances, the court may fix the arbitrators' fees
at a figure higher or lower than those contained in the scale above. 46 Al-
though arbitrators in the ICC are not intended to be compensated on an
hourly basis, in complex cases where they have devoted substantial time
to the proceeding and would otherwise be under-compensated, the ICC
may fix the fees above the scale. 47 In practice, the court is often reluc-
tant to do this, as one of the main advantages of the scale is to provide
predictability for the parties as to the costs of the procedure. On the
other hand, there have been few, if any, cases where the ICC has fixed
the fees of the arbitrators below the minimum figure set forth in the scale.
Under the ICC Rules, if the parties do not state the sum in dispute, the
court will fix the arbitrators' fee at its discretion.
b. Administrative Costs
The administrative costs represent the fee charged by the ICC to ad-
minister an arbitration. The ICC administrative costs cover not only the
services rendered by the chamber, but also all disbursements in connec-
tion with a particular case (e.g., postage, international courier services,
telephone, faxes, or photocopies).
Note that the so-called registration fee is the non-refundable amount of
$2,500 and payable at the request of the arbitration is actually an advance
of the administrative costs. Accordingly, it will be considered in the final
determination of the amount owed as administrative costs.
The court will fix the administrative costs according to the following
scale:48
In order to determine the value of the administrative costs, the
amounts calculated for each successive slice of the sum in dispute will be
added together, observing the flat cap of $88,800 for disputes over $80
million. 49
Where the parties do not state the sum in dispute, the ICC will fix it at
its discretion.50 As in the case of the arbitrators' fee, in exceptional cir-
cumstances the court may fix the administrative costs at a lower or higher
figure than those resulting from the application of the scale above, pro-
vided that these costs do not exceed $88,000.51
45. See id. at art. 2(2).
46. See id. at art. 2(1).
47. See id. at art. 2(2).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at art 2(5).
51. See id. at art. 2(2).
2006] POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 525
Sum in dispute
(in US Dollars) Administrative Expenses
Up to 50,000 $2,500
From 50,001 to 100,00 3.5%
From 100,001 to 500,000 1.7%
From 500,001 to 1,000,000 1.15%
From 1,000,001 to 2,000,000 0.7%
From 2,000,001 to 5,000,000 0.3%
From 5,000,001 to 10,000,000 0.2%
From 10,000,001 to 50,000,000 0.07%
From 50,000,001 to 80,000,000 0.06%
Over 80,000,000 $88,800
c. Experts' Fees
In the cases where an expert exam is ordered, the ICC will fix the fees
and expenses of the expert to be paid by the parties. 52 The administrative
fees do not cover the experts' fees.
d. Other Expenses
For additional services, the ICC will charge administrative expenses at
its discretion, which cannot exceed the amount of $10,000. 53 The parties
will also be responsible for the payment of any other expenses incurred in
relation to the procedure, like the arbitrators' and experts' expenses. 54
These expenses consist primarily of costs for travel and accommodation
in situations where the arbitrators and experts do not live near the loca-
tion of the proceedings. The expenses also comprise of costs of con-
ducting hearings, telephone calls, faxes, photocopies, translations, and
transcript of the proceedings. In addition, there may be expenses in-
curred by experts appointed to work on the proceedings or by a secre-
tary/registrar.
B. LITIGATION
According to article 4(1) of the Judiciary Tax Statute n. 11.608/03, in
the State of Sao Paulo, the plaintiff will be required to pay a judiciary tax
upon the filing of a lawsuit in the amount equivalent to 1 percent of the
right in dispute.55 At this stage, the tax is calculated based on the value
52. See id. at arts. 1(11) & 31(1).
53. See id. at art. 3.
54. See id. at art. 31(1).
55. Pursuant to the rules of Brazilian civil procedure, the party who loses the case shall
reimburse the other party for all taxes and other expenses incurred by the latter in
the lawsuit.
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assigned to the lawsuit by the plaintiff.5 6 This value is sometimes arbi-
trary because the elements necessary for its precise determination are not
yet settled. For this reason, it remains under judicial scrutiny and might
be completed anytime upon judicial request or at the end of the
procedure.
In addition to that judiciary tax, article 4(2) of the statute provides that
upon the filling of an appeal to the state court of appeals the appellant
will be required to pay the amount corresponding to 2 percent of the
value settled by the trial decision. 57 Without this payment, the court will
not assert jurisdiction over the appeal and the trial judge's decision will
become definitive (res judicata).58 In the case of an appeal the party will
also be required to pay for the transportation of the filing back and forth
to the court of appeals, in the amount of eight dollars for each filling to
be carried.
Finally, according to article 4(3) of the statute, the party executing the
final decision will still have to pay another 1 percent over the value being
executed in order to obtain the ultimate satisfaction of its right.59
Sao Paulo's Judiciary Tax Statute also sets a floor and a ceiling for
those values based on the value of the state fiscal unit (UFESP).60 The
first paragraph of article 4 states that in each of the above-mentioned
events the minimum amount to be collected will correspond to five
UFESPs, and the maximum amount will correspond to 3,000 UFESPs.61
As of August 2006, the value of each UFESP corresponded roughly to six
dollars, meaning in practical terms that the value to be collected by the
parties during this month in each of the events referred to above would
vary from thirty dollars up to $18,000.62
In the STJ there is a general exemption for judicial taxes. 63 Therefore,
parties will not be required to pay any amount whatsoever in this regard.
The only expense the parties will incur in this court is the cost of trans-
portation of the filings, according to a scale based on the amount of pages




&rodape= [hereinafter Law No. 11.608].
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. The judiciary tax does not cover the expenses set forth in article 2 of statute no.
11.608/03, which refers to publications, summons, auctions, warranties, expert fees,
and office fees.
60. UPESP, available at http://www.assovesp.org.br/sistema/bin/pg-dinamica.php?id-
pag=320.
61. See Law No. 11.608, supra note 56.
62. The parties will be required to collect another tax should they file an appeal to
challenge any interlocutory decision. In these cases, the tax charged for this spe-
cific act corresponds to 10 UFESPs, which represents approximately sixty dollars.
The party will also have to pay approximately four dollars for the transportation of
each filing. Id. at art. 4(5).
63. See INTERNAL REGULATION OF THE SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTICA, art. 12,
available at http://www.stj.gov.br/portal-stj/publicacao/engine.wsp?tmp.area=340.
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in the filings and its weight. 64 For a process weighing sixty-six pounds, for
example, the party will be required to pay $125 in transportation fees. 65
In the STF, upon the filing of the extraordinary appeal, the party will
be required to pay a tax in the fixed amount of forty-four dollars, regard-
less of the value in dispute.66 Furthermore, a transportation fee will also
be charged according to the weight of the filings. For the same sixty-six
pound filling, the party will be required to pay $127.67
C. COMPARISON BETWEEN ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION
In order to compare the data collected above in an attempt to extract
from it a useful guideline, it is necessary to make some preliminary
assumptions.
This comparison will consider an ordinary procedure. No unusual cir-
cumstances (e.g., incidents, injunctions) that vary from a standard process
for disputing a commercial matter will be taken into account.
This comparison will not take into consideration any expense incurred
by the parties apart from the official costs paid directly to the courts. The
reason for this assumption is that the other expenses (e.g., arbitrators'
expenses, expert fees and expenses, general administrative expenses) will
be incurred regardless of the court that is holding the procedure, and the
difference in value among the courts would not be material for the pur-
poses of this paper.
Apart from the CCBC, the main criterion employed by the courts in
determining how much they will charge for their services is the value of
the disputed right. Following this same criterion it seems appropriate to
consider three different scenarios: (1) the first involving a small claim of
$1 million, (2) the second involving a medium-sized claim of $30 million,
and (3) the last involving a large claim of $100 million. In each of these
scenarios the comparison will aim to determine how much the procedure
would cost in each of the aforesaid courts.
Despite the difference in value, it will be assumed that the three dis-
putes have the same level of complexity. This assumption will not distort
the results because the three different scenarios are not being cross-
compared. 68
The level of complexity assumed for the disputes will be a low one,
which apart from creating a more manageable basis for comparison, will





68. Although as a general rule the complexity of the procedure implies a more costly
arbitration, in some courts this factor may have a more direct impact on the costs
of the procedure. For instance, whereas it is indifferent in the CCBC and in case
of litigation, the complexity of the dispute will be relevant in determining the arbi-
trators' fee under the rules of the ICC.
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not distort the results because it will have a very similar impact in each of
the arbitration chambers.
For the three courts of arbitration, the arbitrators' fee will be calculated
for just one arbitrator. Finally, the paper will not take into consideration
the charges for transportation of filings or the tax paid for the filing of an
extraordinary appeal at the STF, due to their immateriality.
1. A Claim of $1 Million
a. CCBC
If a small claim of $1 million is subject to arbitration in the CCBC, the
parties will have to pay an arbitrators' fee in the amount of $16,203. Due
to the assumed low complexity of the procedure, a minimum of 100 hours
of work is being considered at a cost of $162 per hour.
The parties will also be required to pay a court fee in the amount of
$16,666. At the CCBC the court fee is determined based on the duration
of the procedure. As will be discussed bellow, the average duration of a
procedure in this court is eighteen months, at a rate of $925 per month.
b. FIESP
At the FIESP, the same $1 million dispute will require an arbitrators'
fee of $16,200. The value of the claim in this chamber will impact the
determination of the arbitrators' fee. Nonetheless, in a $1 million claim
the arbitrator fees will already be set at the highest level, requiring 100
hours of work at a rate of $162 per hour.
The registration fee in this case will be $925, determined according to
the value of the claim. The parties will also have to pay an administration
fee in the amount of $20,000, which also varies according to the amount
in dispute.
c. ICC
In the ICC, a $1 million claim will result in an arbitrators' fee of
$11,250. The administrative costs for this claim will be $16,800. As men-
tioned above, both costs will be calculated based on the value of the
claim.
d. Litigation
In the Sao Paulo district court, the parties in a $1 million dispute will
collect the initial tax of $4,629. Upon filing the appeal at the court of
appeals there will be an addilional collection of $9,259. Finally, at the
end of the procedure the parties will pay an extra $4,629, totaling taxes in
the amount of $18,518.
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2. A Claim of $30 Million
a. CCBC
The criteria for calculation of both the arbitrators' fee and the court fee
in the CCBC take into account the amount of work to be performed by
the arbitrators and the duration of the procedure. Thus, these costs will
not vary with the increase of the amount in dispute. The result is that for
this medium-sized claim the parties will still pay $16,203 for the arbitra-
tors' fee and $16,666 for the court fee, under the same assumptions re-
ferred to above.
b. FIESP
A $30 million dispute in the FIESP will cost the same $16,200 in terms
of arbitrators' fee. The fee considered in this case is again 100 hours at a
rate of $162 per hour. It shall be conceded that the FIESP will likely set
the arbitrator fees at a higher figure in this case due to the higher value of
the claim (in comparison with the $1 million claim considered before).
Nevertheless, the lack of objective criteria thereon forces the paper to
consider the higher amount of hours set forth in the table transcribed
above.
In this medium-sized claim both the registration fee and the adminis-
tration fee will have reached the respective caps of these values. The
former will be $1,388 and the latter will amount will be $27,777.
c. ICC
In the ICC, a $30 million dispute will cost the parties $38,750 in arbitra-
tors' fees, and $56,800 in administrative costs.
d. Litigation
In a lawsuit of $30 million the aforementioned limit contained in the
Judiciary Tax Statute will have been reached in all the events provided for
therein. Thus, the tax initially collected will amount to $18,472. Upon
the presentation of an appeal, another $18,472 will be due. Upon the
execution an extra $18,472 will be collected. In the present simulation
the parties will collect a total of $55,416.
3. A Claim of $100,000,000
a. CCBC
As the CCBC fees do not vary with the increase of the amount in dis-
pute, in this large claim the parties will still pay $16,203 for the arbitra-
tors' fee and $16,666 for the court fee.
b. FIESP
Assuming a flat 100 hours of work at a rate of $162 per hour for claims
higher than $1 million, the arbitrators' fee will remain the same $16,200.
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On the other hand, at this level both the registration and administration
fees are capped at $1,388 and $27,777, respectively.
c. ICC
The arbitrators' fee in a $100 million claim in the ICC will be $61,750.
In a claim of such value the administration costs will have reached the
limit of the scale, which corresponds to a flat value of $88,800.
d. Litigation
Due to the cap provided for in the Judiciary Tax Statute, a $100 million
claim will cost the same $55,416 paid for the $30 million claim above
considered.
D. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS
Despite the inherent limits of the present schematic analysis, it is possi-
ble to come up with some conclusions and guidelines from the different
scenarios illustrated above.
One may assert, for instance, that in disputes involving small values,
the CCBC is definitely not the best choice. As the CCBC does not fix its
cost according to the amount in dispute, but rather on the basis of the
time expended in the procedure, the smaller the value of the claim, the
relatively more expensive this court becomes. Conversely, as the value
increases, the CCBC turns out to be a good option. In a $1 million claim,
the CCBC is already less expensive than the FIESP. In a $30 million
dispute, this court is the least expensive among all four alternatives con-
sidered herein, and in a large suit of $100 million, it becomes even more
attractive for its fixed cost.
All three other courts follow a different pattern as their costs increase
based on the increase of the amount in dispute. 69 The difference corre-
sponds to the absolute value charged by each of them.
In small claims of $1 million, litigation is the least expensive choice. At
this level the FIESP is more expensive than the ICC.
But in medium-sized claims of $30 million, the ICC becomes substan-
tially more expensive than the FIESP, which at this level is already
cheaper than litigation. But it is important to note that at this point the
litigation cost has already reached its threshold, meaning that this alterna-
tive will become relatively cheaper as the amount in dispute increases.
69. In fixing the arbitrators' fee in accordance with the sum in dispute, the FIESP and
the ICC differ from some leading international arbitration institutions such as the
American Arbitration Association, the London Court of International Arbitra-
tion, and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. This
method has the main advantage of providing the parties from the outset with an
idea of the costs they are likely to incur. This system also discourages both the
unduly inflation of the amount of the party's claims and the submission of frivo-
lous claims, which may lead to a more efficient arbitration.
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In large disputes of $100 million, the FIESP remains the cheapest alter-
native. But at this point the FIESP costs will also have topped their
threshold and will no longer increase with the increase of the value in
dispute. At this level the ICC remains the most expensive of the alterna-
tives, and its cost will continue to increase because there is no cap for the
arbitrators' fees in the ICC.
These examples confirm the reputation of the ICC for being an expen-
sive choice in comparison with litigation and other arbitral institutions.
This raises the question of whether the sum in dispute should really deter-
mine the costs of the arbitration. In a different scale the same problem
may also affect the FIESP, insofar as it also bases its fees and costs on the
sum in dispute. Some argue that the ideal choice is to base the remunera-
tion of arbitrators solely on time spent, more or less as the CCBC does.
This method would increase arbitrators' remuneration in small and me-
dium-sized arbitrations, but at the same time it would not impact consid-
erably the arbitrations involving large sums. The assumption is that the
latter king of procedure is often much more extensive and time consum-
ing, which in the end would be reflected in the arbitrators' fees. All in all,
it is important to note that both the FIESP and ICC rules leave some
room for a court's evaluation upon fixing the value of the arbitrators' fee,
which may be used to correct inevitable distortions.
The cost of arbitration is usually believed to be high in comparison
both with the amount in dispute and the costs of subjecting a similar pro-
ceeding to litigation. This tendency, however, is not confirmed by the
present analysis, at least insofar as when the CCBC or the FIESP is se-
lected to handle the arbitration. Furthermore, unlike the costs involved
in litigation, the overall arbitration costs are more freely manageable by
the parties through the reduction of the number of arbitrators, simplifica-
tion of the procedure, and the adequate limitation of the scope of the
dispute at the outset of the proceeding.
Because the arbitrators' fees and expenses represent a significant cost
in arbitration, savings might be obtained if a sole arbitrator is appointed,
especially in cases that do not involve much complexity or high sums.
This approach would not only reduce arbitrators' fees but also make the
procedure simpler and significantly cheaper.
The high costs involved in arbitration derive sometimes from the man-
ner in which the procedure is framed and from procedural moves taken
by the parties. Lack of skill, dilatory tactics, and unsuitable procedural
rules may amount to a raise in arbitration costs. Even in institutional
arbitrations, the parties can go about solving these problems by adapting
the procedural rules so as to make them more suitable and efficient under
the specific circumstances.
The adequate identification and delimitation of the issues in dispute
can also have a considerable impact on the costs of the arbitration. The
identification of such issues should be attempted at the onset of the pro-
cedure. After the first exchange of pleadings the court should be in a
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position to precisely identify the issues involved in the dispute. 70 Of
course, during or after the hearings a new issue may arise and adjust-
ments may be necessary. As these adjustments are costly and cause de-
lays, the fewer issues arising during the procedure, the cheaper and
quicker the procedure will become.
In contrast, litigation does not provide any of these flexibilities. The
parties have no control over the judges or over the procedural rules gov-
erning the proceedings. As a result, the parties are usually unable to act
toward the reduction of the litigation costs. Even so, the present analysis
shows that litigation in Brazil is not often called an over-expensive proce-
dure. On the contrary, depending on the nature of the dispute, it may
become cheaper than arbitration.
According to the elements above, the best option available for the par-
ties in disputes involving small claims is litigation or FIESP. In medium-
and large-sized claims the FIESP remains a very attractive court. Perhaps
this helps to explain the increasing demand for the FIESP services in
Brazil.
The other domestic court of arbitration, the CCBC, is the least expen-
sive alternative for medium- and large-sized claims such as those above
considered. As noted before, the CCBC costs do not follow the sum in
dispute, which makes this court even more attractive as the sum in dis-
pute increases. In contrast, for small disputes the CCBC is the most ex-
pensive alternative and might be the last option of parties choosing an
arbitral tribunal in Brazil.
The ICC is the most expensive court for medium- and large-sized
claims. Even when the sum in dispute is small, this tribunal remains
poorly positioned as the second most expensive choice. Based on this, it
is fair to conclude that parties appointing an arbitral court in Brazil would
never be willing to choose the ICC if the sole criterion for such a decision
was the cost involved therein.
Finally, litigation is the least expensive alternative when small sums are
in dispute. When medium and large sums come into play, however, the
litigation becomes the second most expensive choice. Only the ICC is
more expensive than litigation in Brazil in such claims.
III. DURATION OF THE PROCEDURES
The present analysis will not take into account the time spent in the
execution of decisions. According to Brazilian civil procedure, after ob-
taining a decision settling the merits of the dispute and absent voluntary
performance, the winning party will have to file another lawsuit to en-
force the decision. 71 The outcome of this latter procedure will largely
depend on the particular characteristics of the defeated party (e.g., its
70. To some extent the Term of Reference provided for in the ICC Rules is an impor-
tant tool to identify the issues involved in the procedure from the outset.
71. See C.P.C., supra note 1, at art. 566.
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ability to pay the award, its patrimonial profile, the existence of assets for
seizing). As the execution of the award represents a necessary step in
both arbitral and judicial proceedings, this paper will not consider the
time spent there under.
Thus, the length of both procedures will be assessed from the filing of
the claim until the last act preceding the filing of the execution process.
In the case of arbitration, this last act may be the homologation of the
award by the STJ, pursuant to article 35 of the Brazilian Arbitration Stat-
ute n. 9.307/96. In judicial proceedings, this act is the final decision in the
lawsuit, which is no longer subject to any kind of appeal.72
A. ARBITRATION
The remarkable common feature of arbitration, and perhaps its most
appealing advantage, is the rapidity of its proceedings.
From a sheer theoretical perspective, the FIESP and ICC rules furnish
a higher incentive for a faster procedure as compared to the CCBC rules.
As seen above, the arbitrators' fee and the court fees in the CCBC will be
substantially higher in longer proceedings, which may present an incen-
tive for the arbitrators and the court to slow down the pace of the pro-
ceedings. The opposite applies to the FIESP and the ICC, in which the
longer the proceeding the worse for arbitrators and courts in terms of
fees collected. This may represent a strong incentive for them to speed
up the proceedings and reach an award as soon as possible.
In the CCBC the estimated average length of an ordinary proceeding is
approximately eighteen months. 73 In the FIESP the estimated average
length is approximately only seven months. 74 But this amazing mark
might derive from the fact that out of the twenty processes already fin-
ished at the FIESP Chamber, eight of them were settled by agreement
and four were extinguished either by judicial decisions or by a voluntary
act of the party.
Under the ICC the proceedings seem to take a bit longer. As stated by
Emmanuel Jolivet, the ICC's General Counsel,
ICC has not published any statistics on the average duration of arbi-
tration cases administered under its auspices. It seems however that
the average duration is around two year [sic]. This of course takes
into account the cases that are suspended. It is important to note
that the parties and their counsel are primarily responsible for the
length of the proceedings. 75
The apparently longer proceedings in the ICC might be explained by
the higher complexity and value of the cases subject to it in comparison
with those handled by the CCBC and FIESP. It is also important to note
72. See id. at art. 467.
73. The CCBC does not provide official statistics in this regard.
74. The FIESP does not provide official statistics in this regard.
75. E-mail from Emmanuel Jolivet, ICC General Counsel, to Gustavo Valverde (Nov.
2, 2005, 10:32:39 EST) (on file with author).
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that the ICC has administered over 13,000 cases, while the other two
chambers have administered only a few dozen. In these circumstances,
any estimation as to the ICC ends up being much more reliable than
those estimations concerning the CCBC or FIESP.
In any event, assuming two years as the average duration of an arbitra-
tion already reveals an impressive feature of this kind of procedure. As
shown below, this makes the arbitration process a speedy alternative for
settling conflicts.
As noted above regarding the costs of arbitration, the parties also have
much flexibility in designing the arbitral proceeding so as to make it
quicker. The ICC Rules, for instance, expressly authorizes that the par-
ties "agree to shorten the various time limits set out" therein. 76 Here
again the parties can manage the duration of the proceedings by making
proper decisions concerning the number of arbitrators, the simplification
of the procedure, and the limitation of the scope of the dispute.
The conduct of the parties and their counsels during the proceedings
will also be critical in determining the proceedings' length. If the parties
agree on a fast-track proceeding and act accordingly, the duration of the
case can be significantly diminished. Moreover, the courts usually have
the power to step-in and replace arbitrators if they fail to fulfill their du-
ties, which obviously leads to the quick solution of the controversy.
The law and rules may also play an important role in expediting the
proceedings by imposing important constraints to the lengthening of the
arbitral procedure. Article 11(111) of the Arbitration Statute provides
that the agreement through which the parties submit a dispute to arbitra-
tion may indicate "the time limit for the rendering of the arbitral
award."' 77 According to article 23, "[t]he arbitral award shall be rendered
within the time limit stipulated by the parties" or "within six months," if
no express stipulation is provided for in the arbitration agreement or
through mutual consent of the parties and arbitrators.78 Pursuant to Arti-
cle 32(VII), the arbitral award will be null and void if it is made after this
time limit. 79
The ICC Rules also convey a great significance in regulating the timing
of the arbitration. Article 18(4) provides that "[w]hen drawing up the
Terms of Reference, or as soon as possible thereafter" and "after having
consulted the parties," the arbitral tribunal "shall establish in a separate
document a provisional timetable that it intends to follow." Article
24(1)(2) further provides that "[t]he time limit within which the Arbitral
Tribunal must render its final Award is six months," which may be ex-
tended by the court under certain circumstances. 80
76. See ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, supra note 43.
77. See Law No. 9.307, supra note 7.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, supra note 43.
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Another decisive issue regarding the length of arbitration in Brazil re-
lates to the recognition of foreign awards. Article 34 of the Arbitration
Statute characterizes foreign arbitral awards as those "rendered outside
of the national territory." 81 In such cases, article 35 provides that "[i]n
order to be recognized" in Brazil the foreign award is subject to homolo-
gation by the STJ.82
Article 35 of the Arbitration Statute originally provided that this ho-
mologation would be granted by the STF. According to the Amendment
to the Brazilian Constitution n. 45/04 (the so-called Judiciary Reform),
jurisdiction over the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards was
shifted from the STF to the STJ.83 Article 105 of the Brazilian Constitu-
tion now appoints the STJ as the competent court to hear and decide as a
matter of original jurisdiction the homologation of foreign awards.84
Even though some may argue in favor of the amendment, by saying
that the STJ might have a less conservative posture as compared to the
STF and might be able to decide faster on the homologation requests due
to its smaller backlog of processes, this shifting might actually pose a fur-
ther problem to the length of arbitral proceedings. Now the decision on
the homologation of foreign awards is no longer final because the parties
will have a constitutional right to file an extraordinary appeal to the STF
against the STJ decision, which in practice may considerably lengthen the
overall proceeding.
In any event, this further step that has to be fulfilled so as to enforce
foreign arbitral awards in Brazil becomes critical for parties drafting arbi-
tration clauses, as the time spent in the homologation process may well
exceed that of the arbitration itself. For instance, when the homologation
process was still in the jurisdiction of the STF, the proceeding could take
years to accomplish.
Therefore, in arbitrations that may result in enforcement within the
Brazilian territory, the parties should strongly consider choosing Brazil as
the place of arbitration. Despite its civil law tradition, in Brazil whether
an award is foreign or domestic does not depend on factors such as the
parties' nationalities, the subject of dispute, the rules of the arbitration, or
the applicable law. Rather, it depends solely on the whether the award is
"rendered outside of the national territory. '85
In practice, the choice of Brazil as the country where the award will be
rendered may represent a period of several months, or even a few years,
in the overall duration of the arbitration. On the other hand, as Brazil is
81. See Law No. 9.307, supra note 7.
82. See id.
83. See C.F., supra note 14, at amend. n.45/04, art. 1.
84. See Id. at art. 105.
85. Article 34, and sole paragraph, of the Brazilian Arbitration Statute (Law 9.307/96)
provides that "[a] foreign arbitral award shall be recognized or enforced in Brazil
pursuant to international treaties effective in the national legal system, or, if non-
existent, strictly in accordance with the present Law. A foreign arbitral award is
an award rendered outside of the national territory." Law No. 9.307, supra note 7.
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a contracting state to the New York Convention, the parties will be fully
protected should they have to enforce the award in any other contracting
state that has made the reciprocity declaration of article III of the
Convention.
B. LITIGATION
Unlike arbitration, one of the main problems of litigation in Brazil is
precisely the length of the judicial proceedings, both in the state courts
and in the higher federal courts.
The World Bank conducted research on judicial performance in Brazil,
and its diagnosis evidences that the country's judicial system suffers from
several serious problems. 86 The delay in proceedings was found to be
one of the most problematic constraints affecting litigation in the
country. 87
For nearly the past decade Brazil has been experiencing a judicial crisis.
The lengthy delays in resolving cases taken to the courts arise mostly out
of the opportunistic practices of a few powerful actors, namely the gov-
ernment, the private bar, banks, and public utilities. 88 The congestion
resulting from these practices ends up affecting all the users of the Brazil-
ian judicial system. Besides, the analysis of trends in workload makes it
clear that since the early 1990s there has been a dramatic growth in de-
mand on Brazilian courts, which coupled with the lack of adequate struc-
ture of the judicial system also has contributed to the problematic
congestion and delay.89 Accordingly, researchers identified several ex-
amples of cases that wait in the judiciary for years or even decades with-
out ever coming to a solution.90
The World Bank research found that the Sao Paulo district court ac-
counts not only for the major share of first instance filings in absolute
terms-which actually would be expected due to its size-but it also has
the higher civil litigation rate. 91 Another research conducted by the Sta-
tistic Group of the STF shows that in the year 2003 the number of new
filings per 100,000 inhabitants in Sao Paulo district court was 10,576,
against the national average of 4,674.92 In the same year the number of
new cases per judge was 2,476, surpassing the country's average of 946
new filings. 93 Another figure, which considers together the sum of new
cases, pending cases, and cases disposed, reveals that the workload in the
86. See WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 32789-BR, BRAZIL: MAKING JUSTICE COUNT:
MEASURING & IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL (Dec. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.bancomundial.org.br/content/-downloadblob.php?cod






92. See SEMINARIO: A JUSTICA EM NUMEROS, available at http://www.stf.gov.br/
eminario/ [hereinafter SEMINARIO: A JUSTICA EM NUMEROS].
93. See id.
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Sao Paulo district court in 2003 reached the exorbitant number of 8,024
processes for each judge.94 This amounts to a rate of congestion of 91.89
percent, which is regarded by the research as a critical situation. 95 On the
other hand, Sao Paulo has 5.09 judges per 100,000 inhabitants, which
places it among the states with the lowest rates in the country.9 6
The situation in the Sao Paulo court of appeals is also difficult. There
were 937 new filings per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003, against a national
average of 453.97 This represents a number of 745 cases for each judge.98
The workload in the court is 770 processes per judge, which amounts to a
rate of congestion of 56.19 percent. As a result, the Sao Paulo court of
appeals has a backlog of undistributed cases that have accumulated for
several years. During 2004, an appeal took three years on average only to
be distributed to one of the judges of that court. 99
In the STF and STJ, the figures are also alarming. The World Bank
research found that the STF has experienced a dramatic increase in its
workload over the past fifteen years, and since 1990 filings have increased
almost six times.'0 0 As of July 11, 2004, there were 132,797 cases waiting
filing, which roughly corresponds to an entire year of entries.1° 1 And this
is despite the amazingly high productivity of STF judges. In the last few
years the eleven judges of the STF have decided close to 100,000 cases
annually. 0 2 The Statistic Group research reveals a rate of congestion of
58.67 percent in 2003, when 111,916 new cases entered the STF.10 3
The caseload for the STJ showed comparable historical trends to that
of the STF regarding cases distributed and disposed. 10 4 The Statistics
Group research shows that in 2003, 238,982 new cases were filed in the
STJ, amounting to a rate of congestion of 31.12 percent.10 5 The statistics
managed by the STJ secretary reveal an increasing number of cases dis-
posed each year since the creation of the tribunal in 1989, with the un-
precedented number of 216,999 decisions coming out in the year 2003.106
The World Bank research confirms that Brazil's average filings are al-
ready high in comparison with Latin America standards, and that the
caseload handled by the STF and STJ far exceeds outside international
norms.
The predictable result of all these figures is an enormous delay in the







100. See REPORT No. 32789-BR, supra note 86.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See SEMINARIO: A JUSTICA EM NUMEROS, supra note 92.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. GRAFICO DE PROCESSOS JULGADOS, available at http://www.stj.gov.br/webstj/
processo/estatistica/grafico%20processos%20j ulgados% 202003.pdf.
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specific case, as it will depend on a variety of factors such as the behavior
of the parties, the diligence of the judge and the court to which the pro-
cess has been distributed, the need of effecting technical findings, and the
number and nature of appeals. Thus, estimations in this regard have a
great deal of variability.
Nevertheless, a case involving a non-complex international commercial
dispute, such as the one this paper has been dealing with, would take
roughly up to two years to be decided by the district judge. The appeal
would take up to two years just to be distributed to one of the compo-
nents of the Sao Paulo court of appeals, and would take up to two years
to be decided by the court. The special appeal to the STJ would take up
to three years, added to three more years of the extraordinary appeal in
the STF. It is fair to conclude that the length of such a proceeding dis-
cussing an international commercial matter and experiencing all the ex-
isting appeals in Brazilian civil procedure would range from six to
thirteen years.
C. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS
The figures above confirm the common argument in favor of the effi-
ciency of arbitration. On average, the CCBC handles its proceedings in
eighteen months, which is roughly the same time a judicial proceeding
would take in the district court of Sao Paulo. The FIESP assesses the
average duration of its proceedings in seven months. Even considering a
best-case scenario, it is hard to believe that a case could be resolved by
the Sao Paulo district court in such a time. In the ICC, which appears to
be the slowest of the three arbitration courts, a proceeding takes two
years on average. A case subject to Sao Paulo state courts after two years
might be still awaiting distribution at the court of appeals.
It is true that the parties can play some role in shortening the duration
of a judicial case, and under special circumstances, they can even have the
case resolved in less than six years. But the room for interference in the
length of the proceedings is still incomparably higher in arbitration, as it
has a much more flexible procedure.
Assuming interested and capable parties, the chance of shortening an
arbitration will always be much higher, thus outweighing any eventual
reduction in a correlate litigation. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that
even in the two extremes of a range-that is comparing the fastest litiga-
tion with the slowest arbitration-arbitration would still likely be quicker
than litigation.
The assumption is that the parties have selected Brazil as the place of
arbitration and have conducted the arbitration under institutional rules.
As noted above, in such case they need not resort to national courts ei-
ther to obtain the recognition of the award or to enforce the arbitration
agreement. In these circumstances, they will be able to enforce the award
just after the arbitration. This means that normally they would be in a
position to end the whole proceeding-including attachment of assets,
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auctions, and collection of respective value-long before the final award
of a judicial proceeding had they chosen to litigate in the first place.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS AND
DURATION OF THE ARBITRATION AND
LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS
Now the findings as to the duration of the proceedings and the previ-
ous analysis concerning costs must be compared in order to draw the final
conclusions and guidelines of this paper.
A. A CLAIM OF $1 MILLION
In disputes involving small sums, litigation appears to be the least ex-
pensive choice. But the length of the judicial procedure is such that the
expenses arising from the excessive duration of the proceeding might out-
weigh the economy in cost. A long process imposes several costs on the
parties, not only those directly related to the conducting of the proceed-
ing itself (e.g., attorneys fees, in-house legal department costs, expenses
to follow-up the proceeding), but principally those deriving from the ef-
fect of time on the value in dispute. The party will be prevented from
investing the assets in its activities, and even in the financial market, in
which case it might be able to receive a much higher interest rate than
that accrued in the judicial claims.1 0 7 In these circumstances the present
value of the right in dispute will fatally be far inferior to its actual value.
Taking this into consideration, the parties who choose to litigate might
not be in a better situation than those who decide to arbitrate under the
rules of the CCBC or ICC. But the quicker procedure of these chambers
in comparison to the slower pace of the judicial procedure may offset
their higher costs.
At this point the parties would be facing one of the most common di-
lemmas facing a decision-maker: is saving time worth the cost? This is a
question to be answered on a case-by-case basis, according to the specific
circumstances of the parties and the right in dispute.
B. A CLAIM OF $30 MILLION
In medium-sized claims, the CCBC is the best option regarding cost,
and the second-best regarding timing. Conversely, the FIESP is the sec-
ond best in terms of cost, but has the fastest proceeding. Because the
difference in costs between the two courts at this level is small, the parties
might be better off choosing the FIESP despite its slightly higher costs.
The positive effects of efficiency would offset this extra cost.
107. Article 406 of the new Brazilian Civil Code states that if it is not otherwise pro-
vided by the contract, the legal interest rate will correspond to that charged by the
government for its own credits. As of October 2005 this interest rate was 1.51
percent per month. See Civil Code of Brazil, available at http://www.planalto.gov.
br/ccivil_03/Leis/2002/L10406.htm.
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The ICC is much more expensive than litigation at the $30 million
level. Nevertheless, it can deliver an award in less than one-third of the
time the judicial courts would be able to. Again the parties would have to
go about the aforesaid dilemma of making their choice in light of the
particularities of the case.
C. A CLAIM OF $100 MILLION
When larger sums are in dispute, the CCBC becomes significantly less
expensive than the FIESP, which may support the opposite conclusion of
that reached as to medium-sized claims. Here, the faster proceeding of
the FIESP may not make it so attractive so as to outweigh the benefits of
the CCBC's lengthier but cheaper proceeding.
At this level the ICC costs increased even more, becoming significantly
higher than in claims involving medium-sized sums. On the other hand,
the litigation costs have not varied at all, as they had already reached
their cap. Again the decision between arbitration and litigation will de-
pend on the particular circumstances of each case. But due to the enor-
mous difference in the value, it is likely that the parties would rather
litigate to afford an ICC procedure, had their decision been solely based
on the costs and length of the proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of whether to choose arbitration or litigation is a very
complex one. Those facing it have to assess several factors, including
costs and duration. With regard to these two factors, the particular char-
acteristics of the party and the right in dispute are important starting
points for the assessment. Whether the party is financially healthy and
able to wait a longer period for the solution of the case, and whether the
market opportunities for new investments justify affording a more expen-
sive but faster proceeding are just two elements to be taken into account.
The nature of the right and the necessity of having a full trial, along with
the probability of federal and constitutional matters arising out of the
dispute, may also interfere in such evaluation. In any event, within the
limits of the present paper and based on the analysis above, it is possible
to draw the following general guidelines in order to facilitate the decision
on whether to arbitrate or litigate in Brazil:
1. In disputes involving small claims, litigation is the least expensive
option, although its significantly lengthier proceeding justifies a
specific assessment of the particular circumstances before choosing
this alternative. The ICC is the second-best option since it is less
expensive and just slightly more time-consuming than the CCBC.
In a $1 million claim-scenario the FIESP is the most expensive
chamber.
2. In disputes involving medium-sized claims. The FIESP is the best
alternative because its faster proceeding may offset the cheaper ar-
bitration under the CCBC auspices. The choice between the ICC
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and litigation will depend on the particularities of the case. Even
though the ICC is much more expensive, it still might be selected
due to its much quicker proceeding.
3. If larger sums are in dispute, the CCBC becomes the best option,
as the quicker procedure of the FIESP will no longer outweigh the
benefits of the comparatively significantly less expensive procedure
of the CCBC. At this level the ICC costs are so high that the par-
ties might choose litigation despite its much lengthier proceeding,
although this decision may still vary in each case.
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